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AN OVERVIEW OF REGISTRATION,
RECORDATION, OWNERSHIP, AND SECURED
INTERESTS IN AIRCRAFT UNDER THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
LEO W. NELSEN*
THE PURPOSE OF this paper is to acquaint the reader
with the basic registration and recordation provisions
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the "Act") and to
survey the recent reported decisions interpreting key pro-
visions of the Act. This paper is an overview and obvi-
ously is much too brief to serve as an exhaustive
discussion of this area of the law. Some working knowl-
edge of the federal system for registration and recorda-
tion of interests in aircraft is essential for the attorney
handling aviation matters, for anyone involved in aircraft
financing and insurance, and for anyone else who in any
way deals with ownership of or secured interests in
aircraft.
Since the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938,1
the federal government has required that conveyances
and instruments affecting title to aircraft be recorded with
a central federal clearing house. The 1938 Act was super-
seded by the Federal Aviation Act of 19582 which reen-
acted the registration and recordation provisions found in
* Partner, Lucas & Murphy, P.C., St. Louis, Missouri. B.A. 1970, University of
Nebraska at Omaha; M.A. 1975, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1980, Washington
University.
1 Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, tit. V, 52 Stat. 973, 1005-07 (1938) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1401-06 (1982)).
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1401-06 (1982).
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the Civil Aeronautics Act.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGISTRATION
AND RECORDATION PROVISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958:
SECTIONS 501-506
The registration and recordation provisions of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, Sections 501 through 506, are
codified in Title 49 of the United States Code, Sections
1401 through 1406. Section 501, codified in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1401, makes it unlawful for any one to operate an un-
registered aircraft, and describes in some detail eligibility
for registration, suspension and revocation of registra-
tion, and the effect of registration.4 This section explicitly
states however, that registration is evidence only of na-
tionality, and not of ownership. 5 Section 502, codified in
49 U.S.C. § 1402, provides for the separate registration of
aircraft engines, propellers and other appliances.
Section 503, codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1403, is the central
provision of the Act, if the amount of litigation generated
is any indication of importance. This section, entitled
"Recordation of aircraft ownership," provides that the
Secretary of Transportation shall establish and maintain a
system for the recording of conveyances that affect the ti-
tle to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft in the United
States.6 This section also requires the recording of leases,
. See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CONG.
CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 3741, 3755.
4 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(a)-(f (1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(f (1982); see Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros.
Mfg. Co., 679 F.2d 1264, 1270 n.13 (8th Cir. 1982)(questions regarding title of
ownership are not controlled by the Federal Aviation Act); see also 14 C.F.R.
§ 47.5(c) (1988)
The FAA does not issue any certificate of ownership or endorse any
information with respect to ownership on a Certificate of Aircraft
Registration. The FAA issues a Certificate of Aircraft Registration to
the person who appears to be the owner on the basis of the evidence
of ownership submitted pursuant to Sec. 47.11 ....
Owner "includes a buyer in possession, a bailee, or a lessee of an aircraft under a
contract of conditional sale, and the assignee of that person." Id. at § 47.5(d).
,; 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(a)(1) (1982); see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(17) (1982) and
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mortgages, equipment trusts, contracts of conditional sale
and other instruments executed for security purposes in
aircraft engines of 750 horsepower or more and propel-
lers suitable for use on such engines. 7 Section 503, in rel-
evant part provides:
(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is
provided for by subsection (a) of this section shall be valid
in respect of such aircraft . . . against any person other
than the person by whom the conveyance or other instru-
ment is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any person
having actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or
other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the
Secretary of Transportation . . . . Each conveyance or
other instrument recorded. . . shall from the time of its
filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without fur-
ther or other recordation .... '
As between the immediate parties to the transaction, a
failure to record by one, or both, will not affect their inter-
ests in the aircraft.9 For purposes of perfecting an owner-
ship or security interest in aircraft, the critical date is the
date of filing for recordation, not the actual date of recor-
dation, which in actual practice can be weeks after filing.'0
14 C.F.R. § 49.17(a) (1988) which define the term "conveyance" as used in the
Act to mean "a bill of sale, contract of conditional sale, mortgage, assignment of
mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or interest in, property." 14
C.F.R. § 49.17(b) (1988) provides that the kinds of conveyances recordable in-
clude those used as evidence of ownership under 14 C.F.R. § 47.11 (1988).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(a)(2) (1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(c),(d) (1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(c) (1982); see California Chieftan v. Air Vermont, Inc.
(In re Air Vermont, Inc.), 761 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1985) (section 1403 does not
invalidate an unrecorded conditional sales contract between the immediate par-
ties to the dispute and provides a valid basis for repossession); In re Island Heli-
copter Corp., 63 Bankr. 515, 522 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (section 1403(a) cannot
be used to invalidate an otherwise valid transfer as between the immediate parties
to the transfer); Smith v.Joliet Airmotive, Inc., 35 Ill. App. 2d 2, 181 N.E.2d 817,
819 (1962) (bill of sale from seller to buyer was valid as between these parties
even when not recorded); Norris v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 26 N.C. App. 91, 215
S.E.2d 379, 388 (1975) ("The clear implication of [§ 1403] is that the conveyance,
even though not recorded, is valid as against the person making the
conveyance ... ").
lo "Each conveyance or other instrument.., shall from the time of its filing for
recordation be valid as to all other persons .... 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(d) (1982);
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Section 504, codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1404, limits the lia-
bility of security owners to injuries caused when the sub-
ject aircraft is in the actual possession or control of the
security holder." Section 505, codified in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1405, provides for the issuance, suspension, and revoca-
tion of dealers' aircraft registration certificates.' 2
Section 506 of the Act, codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1406,
requires that the applicable law in determining the validity
of any instrument filed under Section 503 is the law of the
state in which the instrument is delivered. Additionally,
section 1406 preempts state law as it relates to choice of
law. 13
The validity of any instrument the recording of which is
provided for by section 1403 of this title shall be governed
by the laws of the State ... in which such instrument is
delivered, irrespective of the location or the place of deliv-
ery of the property which is the subject of the
instrument. 1
4
see 14 C.F.R. § 47.39 (1988) ("[A]n aircraft is registered on the date and at the
time the FAA Aircraft Registry receives the [required] documents .... "); 14
C.F.R. § 49.19 (1988) ("A conveyance is filed for recordation upon the date and at
the time it is received by the FAA Aircraft Registry."); Armstrong v. State Bank of
Towner (In re Gelking), 754 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
906 (1985).
11 49 U.S.C. app. § 1404 (1982). "No person having a security interest in, or
security title to, any civil aircraft ... shall be liable by reason of such interest or
title... for any injury to or death of persons, or damage to or loss of property...
caused by such aircraft ... unless such aircraft is in the actual possession or con-
trol of such person at the time of such injury, death, damage or loss." Id.
12 49 U.S.C. app. § 1405 (1982). "The Secretary of Transportation may . . .
provide for the issuance, and for the suspension or revocation, of dealers' aircraft
registration certificates .... Id.
,' See Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1978). "Thus
there has been preemption by federal law only to the limited extent that Congress
has sensibly federalized choice of law, thereby freeing aircraft financing from the
forum shopping which the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. might other-
wise produce." Id. at 1088 (citation omitted); see also Interfirst Bank Clifton v.
Fernandez, No. 87-1321, (5th Cir. 1988) (1988 LEXIS 6233). Section 1406 is a
federal choice-of-law rule for determining the substantive validity of an instru-
ment. Id. at 19.
14 49 U.S.C. app. § 1406 (1982).
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II. PHILKO A VIA TION, INC. V. SHACKET
Prior to its decision in Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket,' 5
the United States Supreme Court had not interpreted any
of the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.
There was general, although not universal, agreement
that Congress in enacting these provisions of the Act did
not preempt the entire field of conveyances of interests in
aircraft. 16 Most courts that considered the issue concluded
that the Congressional purpose for enacting Section 503
was to establish a single national filing system for the re-
cording of documents evidencing title and security inter-
ests in aircraft.' 7  The Act, however, did not legislate
priorities among holders of various competing interests in
aircraft.' 8 Thus questions of priority between competing
- 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
- See, e.g., Danning v. Pacific Propellor, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines), 620 F.2d
731, 733-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980)(validity of artisans' liens on
aircraft is determined by state law and such matters are not preempted by the
Federal Aviation Act); Texas Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp.
599, 602-04 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state law
addressing original validity of liens and title); American Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation
Ins. Managers, Inc., 244 Ark. 829, 427 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (1968) (Congress has
not preempted the entire field of aircraft conveyances); Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc.
v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 401 N.E.2d 1340, 1344-45 (1980)
(validity of aircraft title instruments filed under Federal Aviation Act is resolved
under state law); Johnston v. Simpson, 621 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah 1980) (state law
continues to determine the validity of conveyances and instruments affecting title
to aircraft after the passage of the Federal Aviation Act).
17 See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft
Corp.), 681 F.2d 365, 368-72 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983)
(the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 creates a single national recording system for
interests in aircraft but does not displace state law assignment of priorities to in-
terests in aircraft); Bitzer-Croft Motors, 401 N.E.2d at 1345.
'8 See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d at 368-72 (the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 creates a single national recording system for interests in aircraft but does
not displace state law assignments of interests in aircraft); Danning, 620 F.2d at
733-35 (the validity of artisans liens on aircraft is determined by state law and
such matters are not preempted by the Federal Aviation Act); Industrial Nat'l
Bank of R.I. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1012, 1015-17 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (Congress did not intend the Federal Aviation Act to preempt all state law
concerning priorities of lien and title interests in aircraft); Texas Nat' Bank of
Houston 235 F. Supp. at 602-04 (Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state law
addressing general validity of liens and title); Aircraft Inv. Corp. v. Pezzani & Reid
Equip. Co., 205 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (Congress has not impaired the
existence and effectiveness of state laws of defining liens and title); American Avia-
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interests were left to state law with two minor exceptions,
neither of which is relevant for purposes of this paper. 19
Much of the litigation over competing interests in air-
craft concerns the situation where a buyer in ordinary
course of business 20 purchases an aircraft that is either
lion, 427 S.W.2d at 546-47 (Congress has not preempted the entire field of aircraft
conveyances); Bitzer-Crofit Motors, 401 N.E.2d at 1344-45 (validity of aircraft title
instruments filed under Federal Aviation Act is resolved under state law); Cessna
Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enters., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979) (Federal Avia-
tion Act does not preempt state priorities law); Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v.
National Bank of Secaucus, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 261 A.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1970)
(Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state priorities law);Johnston, 621 P.2d at
690 (state law continues to determine the validity of conveyances and instruments
affecting title to aircraft despite passage of the Federal Aviation Act). But cf. Sun
Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 Bankr. 925, 927-29 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (Federal
Aviation Act preempts state law as to priority of liens); Dowell v. Beech Accept-
ance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 402-05, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971) (holder of a prior recorded security interest prevailed
over a subsequent buyer in ordinary course who failed to record and who failed to
search the FAA Registry; to follow a state law rule protecting such a buyer would
eviscerate "[t]he federal policy to foster recordation and to protect recorded in-
terests .. "); O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (Federal Aviation Act preempts the U.C.C. provision dealing
with buyers in ordinary course of business thereby rendering a properly regis-
tered security interest enforceable against such a buyer); Continental Radio Co. v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) ("Con-
gress clearly undertook to pre-empt the field of conveyancing of interests in air-
craft ....").
is, The statute creates substantive priorities in one area. It recognizes and pro-
vides for the recordation of the "basket lien", which is a lien over stocks of spare
parts maintained for installation in aircraft. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(a)(3) (1982). It
further provides that a recorded interest in a specific engine shall have priority
over both previously and subsequently recorded basket liens. Id. § 1403(d).
2o The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) section 1-201(9) defines buyer in
ordinary course of business as "a person who in good faith and without knowl-
edge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest
of a third party buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling
goods of that kind .. " U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1982). Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C.
provides that "[a] buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and
even though the buyer knows of its existence." A buyer in ordinary course of
business has no duty to examine the FAA title records before buying. U.C.C. § 9-
307(1) (1982). See Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121,
125 (W.D. Mich 1968); Texas Nat'l Bank of Houston, 235 F. Supp. at 604; Cessna Fin.
Corp., 580 S.W.2d at 494 n.7. But cf Dowell, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (a buyer in ordinary
course by definition [U.C.C. 1-201(9)] is one who buys from one in the business of
selling goods of that kind). See, e.g., Aircraft Trading & Serv., Inc. v. Braniff, Inc.,
819 F.2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987) (purchase of an
engine from an airline was the purchase of capital equipment and did not bestow
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subject to an existing security interest recorded with the
FAA Registry, or subsequently becomes subject to a re-
corded security interest. The majority of the courts that
confronted this issue held that such a buyer, even though
he failed to file his bill of sale, or in any other way record
his ownership with the FAA, nevertheless defeated a per-
fected security interest in the aircraft. 2' The California
Supreme Court in the case of Dowell v. Beech Acceptance
Corp. ,22 issued the leading decision articulating the minor-
ity view that a buyer in ordinary course of business who
failed to record his interest in an aircraft with the FAA
would not defeat a perfected security interest properly re-
corded with the FAA prior to the sale.
upon purchaser the status of buyer in ordinary course); O'Neill, 360 So. 2d at 152
(a sale incidental to the seller's principal business does not make the seller a per-
son in business of selling goods of that kind and thus the purchaser of an airplane
from a fixed base operator did not render the purchaser a buyer in ordinary
course). However, an aircraft dealer can itself be a buyer in ordinary course of
business. Cessna Fin. Corp., 580 S.W.2d at 494. A buyer in ordinary course ac-
quires all the title that his seller has to convey, extinguishes the security interest
created by this seller, and "shelters" the subsequent transferees of the buyer in
the ordinary course by conveying to them title free of the security interest created
by the original seller. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (1982); Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d at
376-77.
2 See, e.g., Sanders, 575 F.2d at 1089 (buyer of airplane in ordinary course of
business took title free and clear of finance company lien); United States Aviation
Underwriters, Inc. v. WTAE Flying Club, 300 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1969)(buyer
took possession of aircraft free of prior chattel mortgage, although the lien was
perfected by a filing with the FAA because buyer acted in good faith with no
knowledge of prior lien); Texas Nat'l Bank of Houston, 235 F. Supp. at 604 (Bank's
FAA recorded security interest in aircraft arising from floor plan mortgage of re-
tail aircraft dealer's inventory would not defeat subsequent purchaser's interest in
the aircraft); Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc., 571 S.W.2d
152 (Tenn. App. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (recorded security inter-
est with the FAA is not superior to the rights of a purchaser for value without
notice of the security interest); Cf. Haynes v. General Electric Corp., 432 F. Supp.
763 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1978) (buyer in ordinary course
who recorded his bill of sale with FAA defeated prior recorded security interest of
lender); Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d
655 (1968) (as a matter of law, recording with the FAA will not necessarily defeat
the unrecorded prior interests of a bona fide purchaser); Idabel Nat'l Bank v.
Tucker, 544 P.2d 1287 (Okla. App. 1975) (buyer in ordinary course took free of
the bank's prior recorded security interest even though the buyer failed to file his
bill of sale with the FAA until after the bank repossessed the plane).
22 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823
(1971); see supra note 20.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Philko Aviation, how-
ever, has effectively overruled these earlier decisions to
the extent that they held that a buyer in ordinary course of
business who failed to record his ownership interest with
the FAA had a claim to the aircraft superior to the holder
of a perfected security interest. In Philko Aviation, Smith, a
dealer in aircraft, sold a new airplane to the Shackets who
paid full price and took possession of it. Smith did not
give the original bill of sale to the Shackets but gave them
photocopies and assured them that he would "take care of
the paperwork. ' 23  Immediately after the sale to the
Shackets, Smith purported to sell the airplane to Philko
Aviation. Smith gave Philko Aviation the original title
documents, but not the airplane, claiming that the plane
was having electronic equipment installed in Michigan.
After Philko completed the purchase from Smith, Philko
recorded its interest in the airplane with the FAA. The
Shackets, relying upon Smith's assurances, never re-
corded their bill of sale with the FAA.24
After the duplicity of Smith was revealed, the Shackets
instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine title
to the aircraft. The Shackets argued that as purchasers in
good faith, state law gave them priority. Philko asserted
title under Section 1403(c) because the Shackets never re-
corded with the FAA.25
The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois entered summary judgment in favor of the
Shackets, reasoning that Section 1403(c) did not preempt
state law regarding title transfers.26 The Shackets were
characterized as bona fide purchasers of the plane in the
23 Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 407.
24 Id. at 408. On remand it was determined that the Shackets, following the
purchase of the airplane, made repeated inquiries of Smith about the registration
of the airplane. Unable finally to reach Smith, they attempted to record their tem-
porary registration papers, not having any of the original chain-of-title bills of
sale. The FAA would not accept these documents for registration because
Philko's claimed interest in the aircraft was already a matter of record. See Shacket
v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 675, 694 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
2 . Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 408.
211 Shacket v. Roger Smith, 497 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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ordinary course of business, and thus secured good title
to the airplane under the Illinois Uniform Commercial
Code. The court held that Philko was not a buyer in ordi-
nary course of business under an entrustment theory,
which would have enabled Philko to acquire title from
Smith free of the Shackets' interest. The transfer to
Philko amounted to a transfer of a security interest and
not a purchase. Thus, Philko was only a secured party.
The conflict was, therefore, between a bona fide pur-
chaser who failed to record and the holder of a subse-
quently recorded security interest. 27 The district court
correctly noted that nearly all of the reported decisions at
that time held that the purchaser prevailed over the
holder of a recorded security interest.28 The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the district court.29
The Supreme Court, however, reversed in an opinion
by Justice White writing for a unanimous Court, with Jus-
tice O'Connor concurring in the result. The court held
that Section 503(c), codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c), pro-
hibits all transfers of aircraft title from having validity
against innocent third parties unless the transfer was evi-
denced by a written instrument, and the instrument was
recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration. 30 Ac-
cording to the Court's reasoning, this conclusion is dic-
tated by the legislative history of Section 503 which
indicates that "Congress must have intended to preempt
any state law under which a transfer without a recordable
conveyance would be valid against innocent transferees or
lienholders who have recorded."' 3' Any other interpreta-
tion would defeat the congressional purpose of creating a
central clearing house.32
Although the first person to record his interest with the
FAA is not necessarily assured of priority, all interests
27 Id. at 1270.
28 Id.
2q Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1982).
.10 Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 407.
.' Id. at 410.
12 Id. at 411.
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must be federally recorded before they can obtain
whatever priority they are entitled under state law. 33 Jus-
tice White quoted with approval from a 1958 article,
"Liens in Aircraft: Priorities":
The only situation in which priority appears to be deter-
mined by operation of the [federal] statute is where the
security holder has failed to record his interest. Such fail-
ure invalidates the conveyance as to innocent third per-
sons. But recordation itself merely validates; it does not
grant priority. 4
The Court concluded that if Philko had actual notice of
the transfer to the Shackets or if, under state law, Philko
failed to acquire or perfect the interest that it purported
to assert, Philko would not have an enforceable interest,
and the Shackets would retain possession of the aircraft. 5
The Court created a possible due diligence exception
when it added that there may be situations in which trans-
ferees, such as the Shackets, used reasonable diligence to
file and cannot be faulted for the failed recordation of the
crucial documents. 36
The Supreme Court thus resolved some of the lingering
questions concerning the interplay between the recorda-
tion provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and state law.
The Act preempts state law only to the extent that it cre-
ates a central clearing house where all written instruments
reflecting a transfer of interest in aircraft must be re-
corded. State law determines priorities, but in order for
the interests to obtain the priority they are entitled to
under state law, the interests must first be recorded.
Although the decision in Philko Aviation finally settled mat-
.' Id. at 412. Cf Bank of Oklahoma v. Martin, 744 P.2d 218 (Okla. Ct. App.
1987) (after Philo Aviation, filing of a U.C.C. financing statement in accordance
with state law is not effective to defeat a security interest in an aircraft that was
subsequently filed with the FAA).
14 Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 413 (quoting Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25J.




ters of priority, the Court left a number of other issues
unresolved.
1. In remanding the case for further consideration, the
Supreme Court recognized as a possible dispositive issue
whether Philko had "actual notice" of the transfer to the
Shackets, as that term is used in section 503(c) of the
Act.3 7 If so, the Shackets' failure to record would not act
to defeat their right of ownership. The court's opinion,
however, does not provide any guidance in interpreting
what constitutes "actual notice. "38
2. The Philko Aviation opinion also suggests that there
may be an exception that would protect a transferee who
has not recorded but who has used reasonable diligence in
attempting to record. The opinion, however, offers no fur-
ther elaboration.
3. Because all transfers of aircraft, to be effective against
innocent third parties, must be evidenced by a written in-
strument filed with the FAA, what is the effect of a late
filing? Is it effective to preserve whatever rights the trans-
feree would obtain under state law or is there a point be-
yond which a late filing is a nullity and preserves nothing?
4. Who are the innocent third parties the Court refers to
when it states that the Act prohibits all transfers of title to
aircraft from having validity against "innocent third par-
ties" unless the transfer has been evidenced by a written
instrument and the instrument has been recorded with the
Federal Aviation Administration?
5. What is meant by a "transfer" when the Supreme
Court speaks of "transfers of title to aircraft?" Does this
47 Id.
-it Several earlier cases have discussed the definition of "actual notice", as the
term is used in section 503(c) of the Act. 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1982). See, e.g.,
Marsden v. Southern Flight Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 411, 416 (M.D.N.C. 1961)
(possession alone of an aircraft is not sufficient to give third parties notice of the
possessor's interest); Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App.
539, 434 P.2d 655, 658 (1968) (if seller does not have possession of the aircraft at
the time of the sale, the lack of possession alone is not sufficient to give any poten-
tial buyer or security holder "actual notice" of a previous interest in the aircraft,
but it does shift the burden to the potential buyer, or security holder, to show
what inquiry was made to explain the seller's lack of possession which "might
affect the bona fides of the transaction"); Cf Aircraft Inv. Corp. v. Fisher Flying
Serv., Inc., 183 So. 2d 441 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
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include non-contractual liens such as possessory (e.g., arti-
san's, garageman's, and bailee's) liens and judicial liens?
III. POST-PHILKO DEVELOPMENTS
A number of these issues and others are addressed in
reported opinions in the five years following the Supreme
Court's decision in Philko Aviation.
A. What Constitutes "Actual Notice" under 49 U.S. C.
§ 1403(c)?
If a secured party has actual notice of an unrecorded
transfer, Section 1403(c) does not prevent effective trans-
fer of title to the party with the unrecorded interest. The
most recent case to address this issue is Shacket v. Roger
Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc.,'9 the district court's decision on
remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Philko Avia-
tion. Judge Shadur concluded that Philko, Smith Aircraft's
lessor and affiliated company, was intimately aware of
Smith's precarious financial condition, and that these cir-
cumstances should have put Philko on inquiry notice.40
Relying upon the Lochhead case, 4' the court concluded
that the term "actual notice" under Section 1403(c) in-
cludes not only actual notice of an unrecorded interest,
but also circumstances that should have provoked further
investigation, or inquiry notice.42 Philko thus had "actual
notice" of the transfer and because of this could not de-
feat the Shackets' unrecorded interest in the aircraft.
The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed Judge Shadur's
decision.43 In so doing, the court concluded that under
Section 1403(c) "actual notice" included not only "knowl-
edge that one's seller lacks good title but also knowledge
of facts that would lead a reasonable person to inquire
further into the seller's title," or "implied actual no-
.- 651 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. 111. 1986).
40 Id. at 691-93.
4 434 P.2d at 655; see supra note 38.
42 Shacket v. Roger Smith, 651 F. Supp. at 690.
41 Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 841 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1988).
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tice. ' '44 The court, aware of the semantic difficulties en-
countered in differentiating between the various degrees
of notice, emphasized that such notice is not to be con-
fused with constructive notice.45
The only other post-Philko Aviation case to discuss "ac-
tual notice" is South Shore Bank v. H & H Aircraft Sales,
Inc.
4 6 In South Shore Bank, the Massachusetts Court of Ap-
peals was asked to determine the relative priorities of a
buyer who failed to record his ownership interest in an
airplane, and a bank whose recorded security interest in
the airplane arose after the sale of the airplane to the
buyer. The buyer argued that the circumstances of the
case, which included the seller's lack of possession of the
airplane, and the seller's deposit of the buyer's down pay-
ment check with the bank, constituted "inquiry-provoking
facts" which amounted to "actual notice. ' 47 The court
conceded that the term "actual notice", as used in Section
1403(c), may include knowledge of facts which provoke
inquiry. 4s The issue, however, was not properly before
the court because the buyer-appellant failed to plead "ac-
tual notice" as an affirmative defense. 49 Even if the issue
of "actual notice" had been properly raised, there was not
a strong factual basis in the record to warrant finding that
the facts presented were sufficient to put the bank on ac-
4 Id. at 170.
4.1 Id. at 171.
Admittedly, the line between "constructive notice," which is not
within the scope of 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c), and "implied actual notice,"
which is, is a fine one. But "constructive notice" often means no
notice, while "implied actual notice" requires (1) actual knowledge
of (2) highly suspicious circumstances, coupled with (3) an unac-
countable failure to react to them. This in turn is a shade short of
the form of actual knowledge that consists of closing your eyes be-
cause you're afraid of what you would see if you opened them...
Knowledge of fishy circumstances that would move a reasonable
person to inquire further is enough.
Id. (citations omitted).
46 16 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 452 N.E.2d 276 (1983).
S7 South Shore Bank, 452 N.E.2d at 279.
41 Id. at 280.
41 Id. at 279-81.
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tual notice.50
B. What Constitutes Reasonable Diligence?
The Supreme Court in Philko Aviation suggested that
there may be situations in which the transferee uses "rea-
sonable diligence" to file, and cannot be faulted for the
failure of the crucial documents to be recorded.5 ' In
those situations, Section 1403(c) will not invalidate the
ownership interest of the transferee. The Court provided
no further guidance on this issue but left it to be deter-
mined on remand. Two cases have subsequently ad-
dressed this issue, and have reached opposite
conclusions.
The district court in Philko Aviation, hearing the case on
remand, determined that the Shackets fell within the rea-
sonable diligence exception to Section 1403(c).52 The
court found the Shackets' reliance on Smith to file the
bills of sale with the FAA, a common practice of the indus-
try, was reasonable.53 In addition, the Shackets continued
to contact Smith regarding the status of their registration.
Two months after the sale, when they were unable to
reach Smith, they unsuccessfully attempted to file their
temporary aircraft registration with the FAA.54 "Reason-
able diligence required no more from the Shackets." 55
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's most
recent decision on the basis that Philko had "actual no-
tice" of the transfer. The appellate court did not review
Judge Shadur's conclusion that the Shackets exercised
reasonable diligence in attempting to record their owner-
ship interest in the aircraft.56 In fact, the Seventh Circuit
in its opinion expressed serious doubts as to the availabil-
.- Id. at 280-81.
5 462 U.S. at 414.
-12 Shacket v. Roger Smith, 651 F. Supp. at 693.
- Id.
I ld. at 693-94.
I ld. at 693.
Shacket v. Philko, 841 F.2d at 171.
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ity of this defense in all but the most extraordinary of
cases:
But we do not want to be understood as necessarily agree-
ing with his finding. Although the Supreme Court left the
door open a crack for the previous purchaser who tries but
fails to file, the circumstances must be extraordinary
before the nonfiler can be allowed to squeeze through.
For, in definition, in a case where the nonfiler's reasonable
diligence is relevant the filer was a bona fide purchaser
who could not possibly have determined that there was a
previous unrecorded transaction which might someday
rise up and destroy his title.
The district court hearing Philko Aviation on remand de-
clined to follow South Shore Bank v. Johnson Hydraulic Mfg.
Co. 58 In this case, the Illinois Court of Appeals considered
the validity of the the reasonable diligence exception sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in Philko Aviation. The court
held that if this exception existed, it was not applicable
where the buyer relied upon the dealer's promise to file
the bills of sale with the FAA. 59 Fourteen months after
learning of the dealer's fraud, the buyer finally attempted
to record its ownership with the FAA. The Illinois Court
of Appeals condemned the practice of allowing the dealer
to forward the bills of sale to the FAA.
In our opinion, mere reliance on another to perform the
ministerial duties of forwarding documents to the FAA for
recording, even if shown, as here, to be a customary prac-
tice between the parties to a transaction, does not qualify
the unrecorded interest-holder for a "due diligence excep-
tion" to the federal recordation statute. Nor, as we see it,
has due diligence been demonstrated by a prompt attempt
to record upon learning of a fraud in the transaction some
fourteen months after the purchase is closed.60
. Id. at 171 (citation omitted).
- 131 I1. App. 3d 1024, 477 N.E.2d 1 (1985).
Johnson Hydraulic, 477 N.E.2d at 3-4.
o Id.
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C. Is Belated Recording Effective to Obtain State Law
Priorities?
In Aircraft Trading & Serv., Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. ,61 the plain-
tiff vendor (ATASCO) sold ajet airplane engine to North-
eastern in December 1982. ATASCO retained a chattel
mortgage in the engine, but failed to record it with the
FAA until March 1985. The Second Circuit held that this
tardy recordation nonetheless preserved for ATASCO
whatever priority its interest was entitled to under state
law.62 ATASCO then prevailed over a subsequent pur-
chaser of the engine, who perfected its ownership interest
by recording after ATASCO finally recorded.63
Finally, we note that the U.C.C. does not require a security
interest to be filed immediately or promptly .... although
it is the most prudent course for a cautious lender. Delay
in perfection does not preclude perfected status at a later
time upon filing. While the secured party's interest may
be subordinated to interests of others arising prior to fil-
ing, "[h]e can, of course, file even after a delay, and pro-
tect himself against interests arising subsequent to such
filing. "64
The Second Circuit cited with approval South Shore Bank
v. Tony Mat, Inc., a recent Third Circuit case.65 In this
case, the infamous H & H Aircraft Sales again promised a
buyer (Tony Mat) that it would handle the registration of
the bill of sale with the FAA.66 (This apparently was the
same fraudulent scheme perpetrated by H & H inJohnson
Hydraulic and South Shore Bank v. H & H Aircraft Sales.67) H
& H did not register the original bill of sale with the FAA
and, instead, used them to procure a loan from the bank
using Tony Mat's plane as collateral.68 The bank then
- 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987).
62 Aircraft Trading & Serv., 819 F.2d at 1232.
'w, Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1235 (citations omitted).
712 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1983).
'" Id. at 897.
67 See supra notes 46-50 and notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
(18 Tony Mat, 712 F.2d at 897.
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perfected its interest by recording the security agreement
with the FAA. H & H defaulted on its loan and the bank
instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine its
rights in the airplane. After the suit was brought, Tony
Mat finally recorded its purchase with the FAA. The Third
Circuit concluded that even this tardy filing preserved for
Tony Mat whatever priorities its interest obtained under
state law.69
A more problematic case is Johnson Hydraulic.7" A proce-
durally complicated case, it contains language that can be
interpreted to mean that where a purchaser has not exer-
cised reasonable diligence to record his purchase with the
FAA, eventual recordation will be treated as a nullity
against any previously perfected security interest: "We
agree that the belated 'recording' in this case was a nullity
as against South Shore."'7 The attempted recordation re-
ferred to in the opinion was made by Johnson Hydraulic
fourteen months after the sale, after learning that H & H
(the seller) had failed to record the bills of sale. The FAA
refused to record the proffered documents because of the
bank's prior recorded security interest.72
In a declaratory judgment action, which was brought
later, it was determined that Johnson's interest in the air-
craft under Illinois law had priority over the bank's inter-
est. Based upon this judicial determination, the FAA
permitted the recordation of Johnson's ownership inter-
est.73 The bank appealed the trial court's decision, and
while the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided
Philko Aviation. The Illinois Court of Appeals, in a per
curiam opinion, reversed and remanded the matter to the
trial court with instructions to reconsider the case in light
of Philko Aviation.74  Because the case, as originally
presented to the trial court for determination, involved
Id. at 898-99.
70 131 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 477 N.E.2d 1 (1985).
7, Johnson Hydraulic, 477 N.E.2d at 4.
72 Id.
7-1 Id. at 2.
74 Id.
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facts nearly identical to those in Philko Aviation (an unre-
corded buyer versus a holder of a subsequent security in-
terest which was perfected by recordation) the trial court
correctly concluded that the buyer's unrecorded interest
could not prevail over the perfected security interest of
the bank.7 5 The appellate court affirmed this decision,
noting that the case was factually like Philko Aviation, and
that it did not involve two recorded competing interests,
the argument that Johnson Hydraulic advanced on
appeal. 6
To the extent that Johnson Hydraulic can be interpreted
to mean that a belated recording with the FAA is a nullity,
it would not appear to be sound law. The better reasoned
approach is found in cases like Aircraft Trading & Serv."
and Tony Mat.78 Whether the buyer has exercised reason-
able diligence in attempting to record should only be con-
sidered when the buyer has failed to record. It should not
negate a late filing.
D. Who Are "Innocent Third Parties"?
The Supreme Court in Philko Aviation refers to "inno-
cent third parties" against whom transfers, not evidenced
by a federally recorded written instrument, will be inva-
lid.79 Although this term is key to the holding of the case,
it is neither a term used in the Act, nor is it explained by
the Court elsewhere in its opinion.
Several recent cases have interpreted the term "inno-
cent third party." Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation
Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.)80 and Compass Ins. Co. v.
Moore8 both deal with the rights ofjudicial lien creditors
vis-a-vis the rights of a bona fide purchaser of an aircraft.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987); see supra notes 61-
64 and accompanying text.
7' 712 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1983); see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
71, 462 U.S. at 407.
so 56 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
", 806 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1986).
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Both courts reached similar conclusions. Each court
noted that the purpose behind the enactment of the re-
cording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act is "to pro-
tect persons who have dealt on the faith of the FAA
register, as to whom it would be fraud to give effect to
unrecorded interests to their detriment. ' 82 Because judi-
cial lien creditors do not lend money or act on the basis of
FAA records, they are not the "innocent third parties"
whom the Act protects from unrecorded transfers. "' The
Eighth Circuit in Compass Insurance, noted that:
[A] judgment creditor is not the kind of innocent third
party who engages in transactions in reliance on the FAA
register intended to be protected by the Act.. . "While it is
clear that purchasers of or persons taking security inter-
ests in aircraft must and do significantly rely on the FAA
register. . .the same cannot be said of general credi-
tors .... Instead such creditors bargain on the basis that, in
the absence of collection, a debt may be later reduced to
judgment and thereby be enforced against the then ex-
isting property interests of the judgment debtor .... [They
do] not deal on the faith of the FAA register to the extent
that [they] should benefit from its protections .. "84
Both Compass Insurance and Bellanca Aircraft cited with ap-
proval the older cases of Curtis v. Carey8 and Marshall v.
Bardin,86 which likewise held that a judicial lien creditor is
not entitled to the protection of the recording provisions
of the Federal Aviation Act.87 It thus appears that where
the competing interests involve an unrecorded bona fide
purchaser and a judicial lien creditor, the lien creditor
cannot prevail on the basis that the purchaser failed to
record.
The Compass Insurance case also exemplifies what the
82 Compass Ins., 806 F.2d at 799; Bellanca Aircraft, 56 Bankr. at 379 (quoting CIM
Int'l v. United States, 641 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1980)).
- Compass Ins., 806 F.2d at 799; Bellanca Aircraft, 56 Bankr. at 378.
- Compass Ins., 806 F.2d at 799 (citations omitted) (quoting in part Bellanca Air-
craft, 56 Bankr. at 379).
-5 393 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
- 169 Kan. 534, 220 P.2d 187 (1950).
K7 Marshall, 220 P.2d at 191; Curtis, 393 S.W.2d at 189.
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Supreme Court means in Philko Aviation when it states that
the Shackets' failure to record would not be a defense
against Philko if "Philko failed to acquire or perfect the
interest that it purports to assert for reasons wholly unre-
lated to the sale to the Shackets....88 In Compass Insur-
ance, the insurance company did not acquire its judicial
lien on Moore's airplane until long after the insurance
company's judgment debtor had sold it. 89 The Eighth
Circuit, deciding Moore on this basis, held that the judg-
ment lien of the insurance company did "not attach to
property which at that time was no longer owned by or in
the possession of the judgment debtor."90 An attaching
creditor acquires no greater rights in the property than
the debtor had at the time of the attachment." Thus, a
bona fide purchaser in possession of an aircraft, despite
the fact that he failed to record, cannot be defeated by the
holder of a security interest which has not attached or
been perfected.92
E. Must Possessory Liens Now Be Recorded with the FAA?
Possessory liens are those liens, such as an artisan's
lien, a garageman's lien and a bailee's lien, that arise by
operation of law on property in the possession of persons
who have supplied goods and or services which enhance
- 462 U.S. at 414.
- 806 F.2d at 798. The insurance company acquired a judicial lien in Decem-
ber 1981, and filed its lien with the FAA in June 1982. The judgment debtor
transferred title to the aircraft in August 1979. Id. at 797.
Id. at 799.
See Marshall, 169 Kan. at 534, 220 P.2d at 187, (citing Fort Pitt Nat'l Bank v.
Williams, 43 La. Ann. 418, 9 So. 117 (1891)). Cf Armstrong v. State Bank of
Towner (In Re Gelking), 754 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906
(1985) ("Attachment, of course, is a necessary step in the perfection of a security
interest ..... Further, in order for a security interest to attach, the debtor must
have 'rights in the collateral".) (citations omitted).
1, Accord General Dynamics Corp. v. Zantop Int'l Airlines, 147 Ariz. 92, 708
P.2d 773 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). A judgment creditor cannot, by levy, acquire an
interest in an aircraft already transferred by his judgment debtor. Id. at 775. But
cf Bank of Honolulu v. Davids, 709 P.2d 613 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985). This case
appears to be incorrectly decided. The court allowed a judgment creditor, whose
lien arose after the judgment debtor sold the airplane, to defeat a subsequent
bona fide purchaser who failed to record. Id. at 620.
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or preserve the value of the property.93 They are not con-
tractual in nature in the sense of the typical security inter-
est (e.g., a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales
contract).94 Most, if not all, states have statutes which
provide that artisans, garagemen and bailees, among
others, have liens upon collateral in their possession in
order to guarantee payment. 95 Section 9-310 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that such possessory
liens generally have priority over a perfected security in-
terest in the same property.9 6
When a person in the ordinary course of his business fur-
nishes services or materials with respect to goods subject
to a security interest, a lien upon goods in the possession
of such person given by statute or rule of law for such
materials or services takes priority over a perfected secur-
ity interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute ex-
pressly provides otherwise.97
In this way, fixed base operators and other providers of
goods and services to aircraft are able to ensure them-
selves payment, without concern for other security inter-
ests in the aircraft.
Most of the reported cases concerning competing inter-
ests between an unrecorded possessory lien (perfected by
possession of the aircraft) and a competing recorded se-
curity interest in an aircraft have held in favor of the
holder of the unrecorded possessory lien who is in posses-
sion of the aircraft. 98 There are no published opinions
See Official Comment, U.C.C. § 9-310 (1982).
' Cf J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-2 at 757-58 (1972) "Thus Article Nine [of the U.C.C.]
applies to consensual security interests (as well as to certain sales). It follows that
the Article does not apply to judgment liens, judicial liens, statutory liens and
other forms of security that arise by operation of law rather than via agreement of
the parties." Id.
1'1 See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 430.020 (1986) which creates a lien in vehicles or
aircraft in favor of persons who store or furnish labor and materials on any such
vehicle or aircraft. Id.
1,; U.C.C. § 9-310 (1982).
97 Id.
!1 See, e.g., Danning v. World Airways, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 647
F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982) (an FBO's unrecorded
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concerning priority of possessory lien cases since the
Supreme Court's decision in Philko Aviation.99
Section 503 of the Federal Aviation Act, by its lan-
guage, requires the filing of "any conveyance which af-
fects the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft
.... ,,10o The applicable federal regulation provides that
Subpart C-Aircraft Ownership and Encumbrances
Against Aircraft applies to the recording of such "convey-
ances" as "notice of tax lien or of other lien."' 0 ' The lan-
guage of both the statute and the regulation is thus broad
enough to encompass possessory liens and require their
filing. 10 2  After Philko Aviation, the prudent course for
consensual lien for services, repairs and storage which was perfected by posses-
sion had priority over a recorded security interest); Nat'l Bank of R.I. v. Butler
Aviation Int'l, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (possessory storage lien
not subordinate to prior recorded security interest); Carolina Aircraft Corp. v.
Commerce Trust Co., 289 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holder of
mechanic's lien took priority over prior recorded security interest); Southern
Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank of Secaucus, 108 NJ. Super. 369, 261 A.2d
399 (1970) (mechanic's failure to record lien did not invalidate his claim against
subsequent creditor's recordation of lien). But cf. Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v.
Beverly Bank, 139 Ind. App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966) (recorded security inter-
est prevailed over prior unrecorded mechanics's lien); Smith v. Eastern Airmotive
Corp., 99 N.J. Super. 340, 240 A.2d 17 (1968) (overruled in relevant part by
Southern Jersey Airways, recorded security interest took priority over prior unre-
corded aircraft repair and storage lien).
w, But see Flightcraft, Inc. v. Continental Desert Properties, Inc., No. 1304 (E.D.
La. Sept 7, 1987) (1987 LEXIS 8513). The court acknowledged that the Ninth
Circuit in Danning v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines) apparently felt that
registration with the FAA was a necessary requisite before the artisan's lien credi-
tor becomes secured. The court in Flightcraft, however, declined to follow this
precedent because the Fifth Circuit had not addressed the issue and thus pro-
ceeded to consider the matter independent of the recordation requirement. The
court concluded that under Louisiana law, even assuming that an artisan's lien in
the aircraft had been properly perfected, the finance company which held the
equivalent of a Louisiana vendor's lien that had been properly perfected by regis-
tration with the FAA defeated a subsequent artisan's lien.
Federal Aviation Act, supra notes 5-10, and accompanying text.
14 C.F.R. § 49.31(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
See Danning v. Pacific Propellor, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines), 620 F.2d 731,
735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980) (artisans' liens are within the ambit
of the Federal Aviation Act). Where state law provides for the filing of notices of
possessory liens, such liens are perfected by filing with the FAA irrespective of the
fact that the lien was not filed in accordance with state law. 620 F.2d at 735. See
also McCormack v. Air Center, Inc., 571 P.2d 835 (Okla. 1977).
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those holding such liens is recordation of a notice of lien
with the FAA.
F. The Effect of Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket on the
Typical Buyer in the Ordinary Course Case
As indicated above, the vast bulk of the litigation under
the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act con-
cerns the competing interests of a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, and the holder of a security interest in
the aircraft. The Supreme Court has interpreted Section
1403(c) to require that transfers of aircraft, in order to be
effective against innocent third parties, must be evidenced
by a written instrument filed with the FAA.' °3 Therefore,
an unrecorded buyer in ordinary course will no longer be
able to defeat a recorded security interest created by his
seller. The pre-Philko cases that allowed an unrecorded
buyer in ordinary course to prevail over the holder of a
perfected security interest are no longer viable to this
extent.104
After Philko Aviation, there can be no doubt that in order
for a buyer in ordinary course to defeat a perfected secur-
ity interest created by his seller, the buyer must record his
bill of sale or other ownership documents with the FAA
registry. The several cases concerning this subject since
Philko Aviation acknowledge this. 05
Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 409-10.
" See supra note 21 for examples of pre-Philko Aviation cases holding that unre-
corded buyers can defeat prior perfected security interests.
., See, e.g., Aircraft Trading & Serv., Inc. v. Braniff, Inc., 819 F.2d 1227 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987) (all interests must be federally recorded
before they can obtain whatever priority they are entitled to under state law); In re
Air Vermont, Inc., 45 Bankr. 931 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) ("It is well settled that state
laws allowing undocumented or unrecorded transfers of interests in aircraft to
affect innocent third parties are preempted by the Federal Aviation Act... "); In
re Air Vermont, Inc., 45 Bankr. 926 (D. Vt. 1984) (citing Dowell v. Beech Accept-
ance Corp., Inc., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 823 (1971), for the proposition that the holder of a prior recorded secur-
ity interest in aircraft is entitled to prevail over a subsequent buyer in ordinary
course of business who does not record).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although Philko Aviation has significantly altered the law
in this area, it has introduced some measure of certainty.
Any transfer or conveyance affecting title to an aircraft is
no longer valid against innocent third parties (i.e., pur-
chasers and lenders, but not judicial lien holders) unless it
is evidenced by a written instrument on file with the FAA
Registry in Oklahoma City. Anyone involved with owner-
ship or security interests in aircraft should be keenly
aware of the necessity of recording with the FAA and
should be familiar with Title 14, Parts 47 and 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, which detail the required
procedures. 06
Advice to aircraft buyers (and to all others claiming inter-
ests in aircraft) at this time should be: Always record
promptly and don't rely on a dealer's assurance that it will
"take care of the paper work."' 10 7
1m; See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
111 Reiley, Preemption of Article 9 by the Federal Aviation Act: New Meaning to "Buyer
Beware", 18 U.C.C. L. 242, 253 (1986).
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